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Optimal Investment Policies for Hybrid Pension Plans 










This paper analyzes investment strategies in the context of alternative hybrid pension plans 
which are optimal either from the perspective of the plan sponsor or the beneficiaries. The 
focus is in particular on how the introduction of minimum and maximum limits for pension 
benefits as well as minimum guarantees and caps on the return of the members’ individual 
investment accounts affect the investment decision. The study finds that portfolio choice of 
sponsor and beneficiaries shows substantial differences depending on the exact plan design 
and the beneficiaries’ risk aversion. The introduction of caps on investment returns emerged a 
possible means to reduce such differences and to share investment risks and returns more 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Since being firstly introduced in the United States by the Bank of America in 1985, 
hybrid forms of occupational pension plans broke through the traditional dichotomy of pen-
sion plan designs (Schieber 2003). Before that, pension promises were either of pure defined 
benefit (DB) or pure defined contribution (DC) character.  
In a DB scheme, the plan sponsor promises to the plan beneficiaries a final level of 
pension benefits. This level is usually defined according to a benefit formula as a function of 
salary trajectory and years of service. In general, benefits are paid as life annuities rather than 
lump sums. As Bodie et al. (1988) point out, the foremost advantage of DB plans is that they 
offer stable income replacement rates to the plan beneficiaries at retirement. The major draw-
backs of DB schemes are the lack of benefit portability when leaving the company and the 
complex valuation of plan liabilities. Moreover, the plan sponsor is exposed to substantial 
investment and longevity risk, which could result in significant contribution expenses. 
In a DC scheme, the plan sponsor commits to paying funds into the beneficiaries’ in-
dividual accounts according to a specified formula, e.g. a fixed percentage of annual salary. 
The most prominent feature of DC schemes is their inherent flexibility. By construction, a 
DC plan is fully funded in individual accounts. The value of the pension benefits is simply 
determined as the market value of the backing assets. Therefore, the pension benefits are eas-
ily portable in case of job change. Additionally, the beneficiaries have full control over the 
investment strategy and is free to choose an adequate decumulation plan at retirement, i.e. 
either life annuities, phased withdrawal plans, lump sum payment or any combination of 
these. While the employer is only obliged to make regular contributions, the employee bears 
the risk of uncertain replacement rates, especially caused by fluctuations in the capital mar-
kets (Bodie and Merton 1992).  
The term hybrid pension plan subsumes the manifold class of pension schemes that 
combine both, elements of defined contribution and defined benefit plans. The motivation of 
hybrid pension plans is to combine the best characteristics of DB and DC plans while cir-
cumventing their major disadvantages. A broad range of hybrid pension plans combine a DC 
type individual account, whereby minimum and/or maximum annuity benefits at retirement 
may be specified by a defined benefit formula. Additionally, investment returns credited to 
the individual accounts may be subject to return guarantees and/or return caps.   4
The asset allocation decision is of major importance for all types of pension plans. In 
a pure DC plan, the plan members have full control over the investment strategy for their ac-
counts. This enables them to adapt the risk/return profile of the portfolio to their individual 
taste of risk. Since the investment risk is completely borne by the members, the plan sponsor 
is indifferent towards the investment policy. This is in shape contrast to pure DB plans. As 
the sponsor is fully exposed to capital market risk, the asset allocation decision must lie with 
him to control his funding situation. In a hybrid pension plan, both parties have an interest to 
influence the investment policy, which may result in conflicts of interest. The extent of this 
possible conflict of interests for different hybrid pension plan specifications is the object of 
investigation of this paper.  
For this, we construct a set of hypothetical hybrid pension plans, assume a fixed set of 
parameters and study over a given set of investment alternatives the optimal investment strat-
egy for particular objective functions, i.e. cost minimization from the perspective of plan 
sponsor versus maximizing risk adjusted pension benefits from the perspective of plan mem-
bers. Although neither the design of the plan nor the assumed parameter specification corre-
spond to any actually exiting pension plan, it draws on elements typically found in real world 
pension plans. In particular the model and results presented in this paper benefited substan-
tially from prior work undertaken on the European Central Bank retirement plan.
1 Compared 
to actually exiting plans, the plan developed in this paper shows a reduced complexity. Inter 
alia, it omits modeling any aspects related to dependant benefits and it also assumes a simpli-
fied population model. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In the next section, we first dis-
cuss the general plan design and the core hybrid elements studied here, such as the minimum 
pensions guarantee, maximum pension limits, and the return guarantee/caps. Subsequently, 
we focus on technical aspects of our underlying model and the decision making process as-
sumed before analyzing the optimal investment strategy, both from the perspective of the 
plan sponsor as well as the plan members. 
 
2.  Designing a Hybrid Pension Plan 
2.1  General Structure of the Pension Plan 
The model pension plan analyzed in this study is a non-contributory funded plan con-
sisting of two types of accounts. First, every plan member owns an individual account. All   5
individual accounts are endowed by the plan sponsor with a payment of 20 percent of the 
members’ annual salary. These payments are the employer’s regular contributions to the plan. 
In addition to that, the plan sponsor owns a separate account, the contingency reserve, which 
takes the role of a settlement account for transfers from or to the individual accounts. The 
sum of the funds in both types of accounts, individual accounts as well as contingency re-
serve, represents the total plan assets. All plan funds are invested into the same asset alloca-
tion and the return on this portfolio is credited pro rata to the individual accounts and the con-
tingency reserve. 
Besides the promise by the plan sponsor to fund the individual accounts with regular 
contributions, the plan design includes a combination of additional guarantees and/or limits. 
These are related either directly to the level of benefits at retirement and/or to the asset return 
credited to the individual accounts. Incorporating such elements has an impact on the obliga-
tions arising from the plan and may require from the sponsor further payments in addition to 
the regular contributions, so called supplementary contributions.  
Supplementary contributions may be triggered in two cases. Firstly, when guarantee-
ing a minimum return on the plan assets, the plan sponsor has to cover possible shortfalls be-
low the target return by replenishing the individual accounts through supplementary contribu-
tions. Secondly, supplementary contributions can become necessary in cases with guaranteed 
minimum pension benefits. If the market value of the total plan assets falls below 90 percent 
of the actuarial present value of the plan liabilities, i.e. the solvency ratio is below 0.9, the 
plan sponsor will have to endow the contingency reserve with enough funds to re-establish a 
solvency ratio of 1. 
Furthermore, participation in this pension scheme is assumed to be mandatory and the 
beneficiaries cannot withdraw funds during the accumulation phase. The management of the 
plan does not take into account possible benefits provided by other (government-run) sys-
tems. Members leaving the plan before retirement are entitled to either leave their funds in 
the plan or to receive the balance of their individual account as a lump sum, limited to the 
actuarial value of the maximum pension where applicable. At the retirement age of 65, the 
available funds are converted into a life annuity. This conversion may be subject to the guar-
anteed minimum pension benefits and to maximum pension limits depending on the exact 
design of the benefit structure, which will be discussed subsequently.   6
2.2  Benefit Structure of the Pension Plan 
In the course of this study, six distinct hybrid pension plan designs will be scrutinized. 
Every plan is characterized by a unique combination of the elements mentioned earlier. Com-
paring these designs aims at investigating the effects on plan costs as well as pension benefit 
levels that each hybrid plan element has and the implications for the optimal allocation of 
plan assets. 
In Case I, which is the benchmark design, the pension plan consists of an individual 
account for every plan member that is endowed by the plan sponsor with regular contribu-
tions of 20 percent of the current salary. These funds are invested in the capital markets. 
Beneficiaries are protected from return shortfalls by an annual capital guarantee, i.e. a guar-
anteed yearly minimum return of 0 percent.
2 In case the funds earn less than 0 percent in any 
given year, the sponsor makes an additional contribution to the accounts. As these funds ac-
cumulated over a plan member’s career might not be sufficient to pay for an adequate pen-
sion, this plan layout also guarantees a minimum level of pension benefits corresponding to 2 
percent of the career-average salary per year of service. In addition, this plan limits the maxi-
mum level of benefits to 2 percent of the beneficiaries’ final salary.
3 In the event of a member 
either leaving the plan or retiring, any funds in the individual account that exceed the actuar-
ial value of the maximum benefits will be transferred to the contingency reserve. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Hybrid Pension Plan Designs 
  Case I  Case II  Case III  Case IV  Case V  Case VI  Case VII 
          
Individual Account  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Minimum Benefits  √  √  √        
Maximum Benefits  √  √  √      
Capital Guarantee  √    √  √  √  
Return  Cap        √  
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Notes: Minimum benefits are defined as 2 percent of career-average salary per year of service; maximum 
benefits are defined as 2 percent of final salary per year of service; capital guarantee refers to a guaranteed 
minimal return of 0 percent per year for the individual accounts; the return cap limits the annual return cred-
ited to the individual accounts to 10 percent. 
 
The subsequent Cases II to V are constructed by eliminating certain plan elements 
compared to the benchmark case. Case II excludes the capital guarantee, and in Case III the 
maximum benefits are additionally removed. Case IV eliminates the minimum benefits from 
the benchmark case, while Case V only includes the annual capital guarantee. Case VI in-
cludes the annual capital guarantee and additionally a return cap of 10 percent per year but 
provides no further benefit elements relating to salary and years of service. If the asset return 
on the funds in the individual accounts in any year exceeds the 10 percent level, the excess   7
return will be credited to the contingency reserve. Case VII does not include any guarantees 
or caps and, therefore, can be interpreted as a pure defined contribution plan. Table 1 summa-
rizes the various plan designs. 
The minimum rate of return guarantee increases the complexity of the pension plan 
substantially. More specifically, the minimum rate of return guarantee may introduce an 
asymmetric link between assets and liabilities. Suppose the value of a given investment ac-
count corresponds to a pension payment in-between the minimum and the maximum pension 
limit. In this situation, a high asset return in any given year permanently increases the spon-
sors’ liabilities for the current and future years. Negative returns in subsequent years do not 
decrease the liability as the minimum rate of return guarantee requires the sponsor to replen-
ish the investment account. Thus the high asset return in the first year had a permanent effect 
on the liabilities.
4 However in a situation where the investment account corresponds to a pen-
sion payment either below the minimum pension guarantee or above the maximum pension 
limit, asset returns do not have an immediate effect on the sponsor’s liabilities. 
2.3  Asset Liability Model and Decision-Making Process 
This section outlines the asset liability model and decision making process employed 
to determine the funds’ asset allocation. This first comprises the specification of assumptions 
about how assets and liabilities are projected forward. Secondly we specify decision rules 
used either by the plan sponsor or by the beneficiaries to identify the optimal asset allocation.  
Independently of whether the asset allocation decision is made by the sponsor or by 
the beneficiaries, a two-step heuristic method is applied which is often found in practical de-
cision making. As a first step, the set of mean variance efficient asset allocations is deter-
mined using standard Markowitz-type portfolio optimization. In the second step all portfolios 
from the efficient frontier are assessed against a projection of asset and liabilities over a hori-
zon of 30 years. 
In order to project the return and risk effects of a certain asset allocation over time, it 
is necessary to specify the stochastic processes that govern the developments of the returns of 
asset classes, interest rates for maturities of three months, representing money market invest-
ments, and ten years as well as inflation rates. The difference between the nominal ten year 
interest rate and the inflation rate, i.e. the real ten year interest rate, is used to discount future 
pension liabilities. The stochastic dynamics of the (uncertain) market values of the assets are 
modeled as geometric Brownian motion, which implies that the log return of every asset is 
independent and identically normally distributed. Long- and short-term interest rates as well   8
as the inflation rate are modeled using the multi-dimensional Ornstein/Uhlenbeck process, to 
cover the empirically observable mean reversion characteristics in these time series.
5  
The investment universe comprises the broad asset classes money market instruments, 
euro area bonds, and world-wide diversified equities as well as emerging market equities. A 
regime-switching model is used to derive expected returns for the fixed income asset classes 
(i.e. money market instruments and Eurobonds). This technique allows consistent generation 
of yield curve projections contingent on expectations about economic activity (Bernadell et 
al. 2005). In the long-term projection of the macro economic environment, we rely on the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) as an external provider of forecasts for the Euro area, the 
US and Japan.
6 Expected returns on equity investments are approximated by add-ons to the 
long-term yields on government bonds. In the analysis the equity risk premium is fixed at 
2.5% annually for world-wide diversified equity. Reflecting higher risk of emerging market 
investments we assume an equity risk premium of 4% for this asset class. All asset classes are 
subject to short selling constraints and, in addition, the investment in emerging market equity 
is restricted to a maximum of 5% of overall investments. Details of the parameter estimates 
for the asset, interest rate and inflation dynamics are given in the appendix. 
The projection of liabilities is based on a discontinuance valuation method usually ap-
plied by plan actuaries. Discontinuance valuation relies on the assumption that service of 
each participant ceased on the respective valuation date. It assumes that at a given valuation 
date the individual investment accounts are translated into a (usually deferred) life annuity 
with inflation-adjusted payments, whereby the minimum and maximum pension limits laid 
out earlier are applied. The real discount rates used for this exercise are and the real ten-year 
interest rates determined by the asset model. Discontinuance valuation is performed for each 
year over the 30-year analysis horizon. The valuation of liabilities requires projecting popula-
tion dynamics comprising the evolution of the number and composition of staff, salaries, 
number of retirees and dependants. For this purpose a hypothetical population comprising 
initially 1000 staff members is constructed. The population is evolved forward using an in-
homogeneous, discrete time Markov chain. Transition probabilities are derived against as-
sumptions made on the company’s recruitment policy, promotion and turnover of staff, evo-
lution of salaries as a function of consumer price inflation and mortality rates. 
Comparing the value of liabilities with the projected value of assets at the respective 
valuation date allows determining the evolution of the plan’s solvency ratio, supplementary 
contributions to be made by the sponsor and average benefits. Given the complexity of the   9
plan design, solutions are determined using Monte Carlo simulation over 1000 simulation 
runs. 
Finally, we make a number of specific assumptions about selection criterions used to 
determine the plan’s optimal asset allocation. To this end, two different regimes are intro-
duced. Under the first regime, arguably the standard for hybrid pension plans, the plan spon-
sor is solely responsible for the investment strategy. Correspondingly, the second regime as-
sumes that decisions are made by the beneficiaries. In both cases investment decisions apply 
simultaneously to all individual investment accounts and the contingency reserve. 
For the sponsor we assume the objective to minimize the costs of running the plan. 
More specifically the sponsor minimizes the worst-case value of discounted supplementary 
contributions, whereby the worst-case value is defined as the 5 percent quantile of the distri-
bution of the sum of discounted supplementary contributions over the 30-year investment ho-
rizon. Thus decision criterions in addition to costs, such as plan solvency, are not considered 
explicitly. The plan funding is accounted for by the solvency rule, as specified in Section 2.1, 
according to which the funding ratio can not fall short of 90 percent in any single year. More 
formally, let SCt be the total amount of supplementary contributions to be made by the plan 





















VaR  (1) 
Investment decisions by the beneficiaries are made collaboratively for all investment 
accounts. These decisions may be made in the context of an investment committee composed 
of staff representatives. Such a body is assumed to maximize the expected value of the con-
stant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function  ) (PBF u  with risk aversion parameter 
0 > γ . 




















E PBF u E  (2) 
Utility is defined over the pension benefit factor PBF which refers to pension pay-
ments per year service expressed as the percentage of final salary at time of retirement. Factor 
PBF comprises all simulation runs and all plan members retiring over the 30-year investment 
horizon. 
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3.  The Plan Sponsor’s Investment Decision 
3.1  Finding the Cost-Optimal Asset Allocation 
In this section we take the perspective of the sponsor of a pension plan. Here we are 
interested in the interrelation between the asset allocation for the individual pension accounts 
and the resulting plan costs measured in terms of supplementary contributions by the plan 
sponsor. We therefore look at the different plan designs described above. Figure 1 depicts the 
worst case supplementary contributions for Cases I to IV for different portfolio allocations, 
and Figure 2 for Cases V and VI. Worst case costs are measured as the 5 percent value at risk 
of the supplementary contributions, i.e. the present value of contributions by the plan sponsor 
exceeding the regular payments of 20 percent of the salaries. The portfolio allocations are 
represented by the mean-variance efficient portfolio returns. The details of the cost-optimal 
asset allocations, i.e. the asset weights for Cash, Eurobonds, Global-, and Emerging Markets 
Equities, are reported in panel 1 of Table 2. Panel 2 contains the distributional characteristics 
of the discounted supplementary contributions for the cost-optimal asset allocations. Finally, 
panel 3 reports the resulting pension benefits for these allocations in terms of security equiva-
lents. These security equivalents are calculated according to the utility function stated above 
and for four different parameters of relative risk aversion. 
Looking at the base case, Case I, in Figure 1 it can be observed that the worst case 
plan costs form a U-shaped curve. With increasing expected portfolio returns the costs first 
decrease and then increase again, resulting in minimum supplementary contributions for an 
asset allocation with an expected return of 5.57 percent. This portfolio consists of about 84 
percent bonds and 16 percent equities. The minimum supplementary contributions amount to 
42.49 percent of the expected regular contributions. Hence, for every discounted Euro the 
sponsor regularly paid into the plan additional payments of 42.49 discounted Cents are re-
quired to cover the costs of the plan. The U-shape of the cost curve can be directly related to 
the guarantees included in Case I. Investing in portfolios mainly consisting of cash or bonds 
will result in assets not being able to generate enough return to cover the costs of the guaran-
teed minimum benefits. These costs have to be borne by the plan sponsor. As the expected 
return on the portfolio increases, it becomes more and more likely that the funds suffice to at 
least pay the minimum pension without further contributions by the plan sponsor. The rise in 
expected portfolio return is in turn accompanied by an increase in return volatility, which in-
duces costs resulting from falling short of the guaranteed minimum annual asset return of 0 
percent. From a certain level of volatility onwards, these newly induced costs overcompen-  11
sate the cost savings related to the minimum pension benefits and the overall costs increase 
again.  
 
Table 2: Optimal Investment Decision - Sponsor’s View 
  Case I  Case II  Case III  Case IV  Case V  Case VI 
        
Panel 1: Cost-Optimal Asset Allocation 
Mean Return  5.57%  5.70%  5.76% 5.63% 4.55% 5.95% 
Volatility 4.68%  5.23%  5.53% 4.94% 2.17% 6.53% 
        
Cash 0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 0.00%  71.28% 0.00% 
Eurobonds 84.27%  79.16%  76.61% 81.72% 28.04% 68.95% 
Global Equities  10.73%  15.84% 18.39% 13.28%  0.68%  26.05% 
EM Equities  5.00%  5.00%  5.00% 5.00% 0.00% 5.00% 
        
Panel 2: Distributional Characteristics of DSC with Optimal Asset Allocation 
Mean DSC  19.64% 18.44% 22.14% 9.24% 13.02% 7.00%
Std. DSC  13.03% 12.89% 12.60% 9.62% 8.01% 9.17%
5%-VaR DSC  42.49% 41.50% 43.95% 27.01% 28.04% 25.87%
25%-Q DSC  10.27% 9.04% 12.71% 0.00% 6.95% 0.00%
50%-Q DSC  17.56% 16.12% 19.87% 6.70% 12.15% 2.77%
75%-Q DSC  26.92% 25.65% 29.41% 15.17% 17.96% 11.39%
        
Panel 3: Distributional Characteristics of PB with Optimal Asset Allocation 
Mean PB  1.875%  1.872%  2.257% 1.793% 1.531% 1.939% 
Std. PB  0.045%  0.050%  0.415% 0.102% 0.205% 0.307% 
Security Equivalent (γ = 1)  1.874%  1.872%  2.223% 1.790% 1.517% 1.915% 
Security Equivalent (γ = 5)  1.872%  1.869%  2.121% 1.776% 1.470% 1.827% 
Security Equivalent (γ = 10)  1.869%  1.866%  2.040% 1.750% 1.421% 1.726% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Discounted Supplementary Contributions (DSC) in percent of expected discounted regular contri-
butions; Pension Benefits (PB) in percent of final salary per year or service; Objective function: Minimize 
the 5 percent VaR of DSC; Q: quantile; Case I: DC + minimum benefits + maximum benefits + capital 
guarantee; Case II: DC + minimum benefits + maximum benefits; Case III: DC + minimum benefits; 
Case IV: DC + maximum benefits + capital guarantee; Case V: DC + capital guarantee; Case VI: DC + 
capital guarantee + 10% cap on asset return. 
 
Changing the structural design of the plan has the following effects. Eliminating the 
annual return guarantee for the individual accounts, Case II, reduces the amount of supple-
mentary contributions, especially in the case of a more risky asset allocation. However, the 
asset allocation, which minimizes the costs, is only slightly different compared to Case I, i.e. 
about 5 percent less bonds and more equities. The total worst case costs only decrease from 
42.49 percent to 41.5 percent of regular contributions. This results from the fact that for a low 
risk asset allocation the costs from the annual return guarantee are relatively low. 
In Case III not only the capital guarantee but also the maximum pension regulation is 
eliminated. In this case, the plan is basically a defined contribution plan in which the benefi-
ciaries are protected by defined minimum pension benefits against adverse capital market de-
velopments. Therefore, it is obvious that the amount of supplementary contributions increases   12
compared to Case II, as there are no longer funds in excess of those needed to provide maxi-
mum pension benefits, which could be credited to the plan sponsor. Looking at the cost 
minimizing asset allocation, the equity exposure is slightly further increased to about 13.4 
percent with overall worst case supplementary contributions of 43.95 percent. 
 



































































































































Case I Case II
Case III Case IV
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Discounted Supplementary Contributions (DSC) in percent of expected discounted regular contri-
butions; Case I: DC + minimum benefits + maximum benefits + capital guarantee; Case II: DC + mini-
mum benefits + maximum benefits; Case III: DC + minimum benefits; Case IV: DC + maximum benefits 
+ capital guarantee. 
 
Case IV shows a quite different curve. The general U-shape is maintained showing a 
minimum of supplementary contributions for a portfolio return of 5.63 percent, which corre-
sponds to an asset allocation of 81.72 percent bonds and 18.28 percent equities. While the 
asset allocation is comparable to the Cases I to III, the level of supplementary contributions 
with 27.01 percent of regular contributions is substantially lower than in the previous cases. 
Additionally, the left branch of the cost curve (low risk portfolios) is nearly flat while the 
right branch (more risky portfolios) shows a strong increase. Economically, this can be ex-
plained as follows. As discussed for Case I, the predominant source of costs, especially when 
investing into low risk allocations, is the minimum benefit guarantee. This guarantee is not   13
included in Case IV leading to substantially lower costs compared to Case I. Increasing the 
expected return and the volatility of the portfolio now has two opposing effects. The higher 
the (expected) portfolio return the more often the plan sponsor will profit from cashing in 
funds from the individual retirement accounts that exceed the amount necessary to cover the 
maximum pension benefits. Contrarily, the higher the return volatility the more often sup-
plementary contributions will be triggered due to the annual capital guarantee. Since the for-
mer effect dominates the latter for less risky portfolios, the overall costs first decrease with 
increasing expected portfolio return. For more risky allocations the latter effect dominates the 
former, which leads to rapidly growing contributions. As the cost impact of the minimum 
benefit guarantee is diminishing for increasing portfolio returns, Cases I and IV hardly differ 
for highly risky portfolios. 
We now turn to the cases with no explicit defined minimum or maximum benefits. 
These are depicted in Figure 2. Case V shows a plan with unlimited upside potential but with 
a shortfall protection resulting from the annual return guarantee. It is clear that such a plan 
design results in increasing supplementary contributions the higher the equity exposure. 
Hence, minimizing the costs in terms of supplementary contributions leads to the minimum 
volatility portfolio, consisting of 71.28 percent cash, 28.04 percent bonds and only 0.68 per-
cent equities. 
As in Case V, Case VI offers an annual capital guarantee and therefore protection 
against return shortfalls. However, the upside potential is limited due to the 10 percent return 
cap. This structural change has a significant impact on the shape of the cost curve. While the 
amount of supplementary contributions in Cases V and VI is approximately equal for low risk 
asset allocations, the costs in Case VI begin to decrease again for increasing portfolio return 
and volatility. For these allocations the increasing costs resulting from the capital guarantee 
are overcompensated by the profits the plan sponsor can generate through cashing in any re-
turns that exceed the 10 percent cap. With volatility even more increasing, the costs of the 
capital guarantee increase disproportionately, leading to overall growing supplementary con-
tributions. With minimum worst case costs of 25.87 percent resulting from investing in about 
69 percent bonds and 21 percent equities this case proves to be the cheapest of all plan de-
signs discussed. This holds for the minimum cost asset allocation and especially for all port-
folios with high expected returns and volatilities.   14



































































































































Case V Case VI
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Discounted Supplementary Contributions (DSC) in percent of expected discounted regular contri-
butions; Case V: DC + capital guarantee; Case VI: DC + capital guarantee + 10% cap on asset return. 
 
3.2  Utility-Implications for the Beneficiaries 
The implications investing in the cost-minimizing portfolios will have for the ex-
pected pension benefits the members will receive can be derived from panel 3 in Table 2 and 
from Figure 3. Panel 3 of Table 2 summarizes expected pension benefit factors and their 
standard deviation, expressing the pension benefits in percent of final salary per year of ser-
vice. In order to relate the whole probability distribution of the pension benefit factors to the 
risk aversion of a representative beneficiary the pension factor security equivalents are calcu-
lated for a range of risk aversion parameters using the standard CRRA utility function. This 
allows a direct evaluation of the cost-optimal asset allocation for the various plan designs, 
Case I to VI, from the perspective of plan members with different levels of risk aversion. 
Figure 3 depicts the security equivalents for all parameters of risk aversion from one to ten in 
steps of 0.5. Additionally, numerical results for selected levels of risk aversion (gamma = 1, 
5, and 10) are presented in panel 3 of Table 2.   15




























































































Case I Case II Case III
Case IV Case V Case VI
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Case I: DC + minimum benefits + maximum benefits + capital guarantee; Case II: DC + mini-
mum benefits + maximum benefits; Case III: DC + minimum benefits; Case IV: DC + maximum bene-
fits + capital guarantee; Case V: DC + capital guarantee; Case VI: DC + capital guarantee + 10% cap on 
asset return. 
 
Attending to Figure 3, it can be easily observed that Case III results in the highest 
pension benefit factors for all levels of risk aversion under scrutiny, with the mean benefit 
factor being 2.257 percent (see Table 2, panel 3). At the same time, Case V always produces 
the lowest factors, on average 1.531 percent. This is an interesting result, as both cases show 
structural similarities. Case III and V both offer downside protection to the beneficiaries, 
Case III by means of guaranteed minimum pension benefits, Case V with the annual capital 
guarantee for the individual accounts. Neither case limits the upside potential. An explanation 
for this can be found when looking at the different cost-minimal asset allocations. Optimizing 
the amount of supplementary contributions in Case V, the plan sponsor will only invest into 
cash and bonds, resulting in the lowest risk exposure with respect to the capital guarantee. 
The highly conservative risk and return profile of the assets simultaneously leads to low ex-
pected pension benefits. Such an asset allocation, however, is not appropriate in Case III, 
since its return expectations are insufficient to cover the costs resulting from the guaranteed 
minimum benefits, i.e. 2 percent of the career-average salary per year of service. It is rather   16
necessary to implement a portfolio strategy that offers higher mean returns, coming at the 
cost of higher volatility. This, in turn, leads to substantially higher supplementary contribu-
tions, since the plan sponsor fully bears the downside volatility while only the beneficiaries 
profit from the upside volatility. 
Implementing a maximum benefit cap (2 percent of final salary per year of service) 
results in considerably reduced volatilities of the pension benefit factors, i.e. 0.045 percent 
for Case I, 0.05 percent for Case II, and 0.102 percent for Case IV (see Table 2, panel 3). 
Consequently, the security equivalents of the pension benefit factors are nearly constant for 
the various risk aversion coefficients reported in Figure 3. Among these cases, Case I offers 
the highest pension benefits but is also the most costly design. Case II only offers slightly 
lower benefits combined with slightly lower costs. 
In general it can be concluded that the plans, which offer the highest expected pension 
benefits, tend to cause the highest amount of supplementary contributions. Yet there are two 
exemptions: Case V offers by far the lowest pension benefits, however, even for the optimal 
asset allocation the costs are not minimal. In contrast to that, Case VI causing the lowest sup-
plementary contribution will lead to expected pensions benefits that exceed all but one case. 
The rather high volatility of the pension benefit factor, however, causes the security equiva-
lents to drop below those of most other cases for higher levels of risk aversion. 
 
4.  The Beneficiaries’ Investment Decision 
 
In this section we assume that the asset allocation decision is made by the beneficiar-
ies of the pension plan. In this context, the plan members’ objective function is to maximize 
the expected utility of pension benefits by choosing the appropriate asset allocation. This is 
done for all Cases I to VI and for the purpose of comparison also for Case VII, a pure defined 
contribution plan. Our interest in this section is to look at the resulting pension benefits for 
the plan member with different risk aversion as well as the composition of the optimal asset 
allocation. As in Section 3 the portfolio allocations are represented by the mean-variance ef-
ficient portfolio returns. The details of the benefit-optimal investment weights, i.e. the mean 
and volatility of asset returns, mean and security equivalents of pension benefit factors for 
plan members as well the resulting costs in terms of supplementary contribution for the plan 
sponsor are reported Table 3. Panel 1 contains the results for a representative plan member   17
with a low (gamma = 1), Panel 2 with a medium (gamma = 5), and Panel 3 with a high 
(gamma = 10) coefficient of risk aversion. Details of the investment weights in Cash, Euro-
bonds, Global-, and Emerging Markets Equities, are reported in Table 4.  
 
Table 3: Optimal Investment Decision - Members’ View 
  Case I  Case II  Case III  Case IV  Case V  Case VI  Case VII 
          
Panel 1: Low Level of Risk Aversion (Gamma = 1) 
Mean Return  7.68%  7.68%  7.68% 7.68% 7.68% 7.68%  7.68% 
Volatility  17.27% 17.27% 17.27% 17.27% 17.27% 17.27%  17.27% 
Mean  DSC  30.91% 24.60% 29.80% 26.58% 126.85% 14.29%  0.00% 
5%-VaR  DSC  87.93% 75.71% 79.28% 84.52% 246.62% 51.33%  0.00% 
Mean  PB  1.974% 1.915% 3.937% 1.949% 6.890% 1.948%  3.793% 
Security Equivalent  1.974%  1.914% 3.355% 1.948% 6.014% 1.918% 3.093% 
          
Panel 2: Medium Level of Risk Aversion (Gamma = 5) 
Mean Return  7.68%  7.61%  7.68% 7.68% 7.68% 5.89%  6.33% 
Volatility  17.27% 16.83% 17.27% 17.27% 17.27%  6.18%  8.74% 
Mean  DSC  30.91% 24.14% 29.80% 26.58% 126.85% 7.35%  0.00% 
5%-VaR  DSC  87.93% 74.14% 79.28% 84.52% 246.62% 26.06%  0.00% 
Mean  PB  1.974% 1.915% 3.937% 1.949% 6.890% 1.937%  2.543% 
Security Equivalent  1.973%  1.909% 2.449% 1.947% 4.011% 1.827% 2.007% 
          
Panel 3: High Level of Risk Aversion (Gamma = 10) 
Mean Return  7.68%  7.61%  7.61% 7.68% 7.68% 5.76%  5.76% 
Volatility  17.27% 16.83% 16.83% 17.27% 17.27%  5.53%  5.53% 
Mean  DSC  30.91% 24.14% 29.22% 26.58% 126.85% 7.98%  0.00% 
5%-VaR  DSC  87.93% 74.14% 77.68% 84.52% 246.62% 26.31%  0.00% 
Mean  PB  1.974% 1.915% 3.847% 1.949% 6.890% 1.930%  2.155% 
Security Equivalent  1.973%  1.902% 2.160% 1.944% 2.990% 1.729% 1.760% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Discounted Supplementary Contributions (DSC) in percent of expected discounted regular contributions; 
Pension Benefits (PB) in percent of final salary per year of service; Objective function: Maximize the expected 
utility of pension benefits using a CRRA utility function defined over the pension benefits in percent of final 
salary per year of service; Case I: DC + minimum benefits + maximum benefits + capital guarantee; Case II: 
DC + minimum benefits + maximum benefits; Case III: DC + minimum benefits; Case IV: DC + maximum 
benefits + capital guarantee; Case V: DC + capital guarantee; Case VI: DC + capital guarantee + 10% cap on 
asset return; Case VII: DC. 
 
Independent of the level of risk aversion, for Cases I to V the plan beneficiaries would 
opt to invest into the asset allocation that offers the highest or almost the highest expected 
return and the highest or almost the highest volatility. As shown in Table 4, the optimal asset 
allocation consists of 100% stocks. In all these cases the beneficiaries are protected against 
downside volatility of the international equity markets either by guaranteed minimum pen-
sion benefits and/or by the annual capital guarantee. The value of this downside protection 
ceteris paribus increases with the volatility. In analogy to the foundations of option pricing 
theory, the minimum pension benefits and the capital guarantee can be interpreted as a call 
option, for which the value is also positively related to the volatility of the underlying. Look-
ing at the level of supplementary contributions associated with these asset allocations, it is   18
obvious that the cost for the plan sponsor are prohibitively high. This especially holds for 
Case V, in which the members’ individual accounts are protected against negative fluctua-
tions in the capital markets while at the same time offering full participation in positive re-
turns. Here, the security equivalents of the pension benefit factors vary between 6.014 percent 
for a low risk aversion of gamma = 1 and 2.99 percent for a relatively high coefficient of rela-
tive risk aversion of gamma = 10. These high pension benefits are associated with worst case 
(mean) supplementary contributions of 246.62 percent (126.85 percent). It is clear that these 
costs are unacceptable from the perspective of the plan sponsor. 
 
Table 4: Optimal Asset Allocation - Members’ View 
  Case I  Case II  Case III  Case IV  Case V  Case VI  Case VII 
          
Panel 1: Low Level of Risk Aversion (Gamma = 1) 
Cash  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
Eurobonds  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
Global Equities  95.00%  95.00%  95.00% 95.00% 95.00% 95.00%  95.00% 
EM  Equities  5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00%  5.00% 
          
Panel 2: Medium Level of Risk Aversion (Gamma = 5) 
Cash  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
Eurobonds  0.00% 2.55% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  71.50%  53.63% 
Global Equities  95.00%  92.45%  95.00% 95.00% 95.00% 23.50%  41.37% 
EM  Equities  5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00%  5.00% 
          
Panel 3: High Level of Risk Aversion (Gamma = 10) 
Cash  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  0.00% 
Eurobonds  0.00% 2.55% 2.55% 0.00% 0.00%  76.61%  76.61% 
Global Equities  95.00%  92.45%  92.45% 95.00% 95.00% 18.39%  18.39% 
EM  Equities  5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00%  5.00% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Objective function: Maximize the expected utility of pension benefits using a CRRA utility func-
tion defined over the pension benefits in percent of final salary per year of service; Case I: DC + mini-
mum benefits + maximum benefits + capital guarantee; Case II: DC + minimum benefits + maximum 
benefits; Case III: DC + minimum benefits; Case IV: DC + maximum benefits + capital guarantee; Case 
V: DC + capital guarantee; Case VI: DC + capital guarantee + 10% cap on asset return; Case VII: DC. 
 
Cases I, II, and IV limit the upside potential available to the beneficiaries by incorpo-
rating the maximum pension benefit restriction. This results in lower benefits and lower costs 
compared to Case V, yet the plan members still have the incentive to choose portfolios with 
very high volatility. Even though the costs are substantially reduced, they are still intolerably 
high. For example in Case IV, i.e. Case V with incorporated maximum benefit limit, the 
worst case (expected) supplementary contributions amount to 84.52 percent (26.58 percent), 
being about three times as high as in case the plan sponsor chooses the asset allocation.  
Turning to Case VI results in a different picture. This case is characterized by the an-
nual capital guarantee and a 10 percent cap on the maximum annual asset return credited to   19
the beneficiaries’ individual accounts. While beneficiaries with a low level of risk aversion, 
i.e. gamma = 1, will still invest in the maximum expected return/maximum volatility portfo-
lio, more risk averse plan members will choose an asset allocation with substantially reduced 
exposure to capital market risk. For a medium (high) level of risk aversion, i.e. gamma = 5 
(10), the allocation to bonds will increase from 0 percent, as for gamma = 1, to 71.5 (78.61) 
percent (see Table 4). An interesting observation follows when comparing this benefit opti-
mal asset allocation from the members’ perspective (with moderate to high risk aversion) to 
the cost optimal asset allocation from the sponsor’s perspective as given in panel 1 of Table 
2. From both perspectives, the optimal investment strategy is nearly identical, i.e. including a 
high exposure to bonds and a low exposure to equities. This results in quite similar cost im-
plication in terms of supplementary contributions. If the plan sponsor set the asset allocation, 
the 5%-Value-at-Risk of supplementary contributions would be 25.87 percent (panel 2 of Ta-
ble 2), while in case a representative member with a risk aversion of gamma = 5 (gamma = 
10) chose the (benefit) optimal asset allocation this would result in supplementary contribu-
tions for the plan sponsor of 26.06% (26.31%). Hence, if the benefit structure of the pension 
plan is designed according to Case VI this will lead to “harmony” of the members’ and spon-
sor’s interests, at least with respect to the asset allocation decision for a given plan design. 
However, while Case VI seems to be most suitable among the hybrid pension plans, 
combining acceptable cost consequences for the sponsor and attractive pension benefit fac-
tors for the plan members, a superior plan design exists. Case VII is a pure defined contribu-
tion plan with no capital guarantee and no return cap. By construction, this plan causes no 
additional costs in term of supplementary contributions for the sponsor. Additionally, as 
shown in Table 3, a pure DC plan provides higher mean pension benefits as well as security 
equivalents for all levels of risk aversion. This result is due to the specification of the 
floor/cap structure, i.e. a minimum rate of return of 0 percent per year and a return maximum 
of 10 percent per year. When setting the cap to an annual return of 12.5 percent and leaving 
the floor constant at 0 percent leads to the following results: For members with a low level of 
risk aversion, i.e. gamma = 1, the security equivalent for the benefit factor of the hybrid plan 
is still lower than in the case of a pure DC plan (2.283 percent compared to 3.093 percent). 
For members with medium to high levels of risk aversion, i.e. gamma = 5 (10), the hybrid 
plan is more attractive than the pure defined contribution plan. The security equivalents are 
2.100 percent compared to 2.007 percent for gamma = 5, and 1.913 percent compared to 
1.760 percent for gamma = 10. Yet increasing the cap to 12.5 percent, the plan members will 
again choose the maximum volatility portfolio, i.e. 100 percent equities, independent of their   20
level of risk aversion. Unfortunately this will cause unacceptable costs in terms of supple-
mentary contributions for the plan sponsor. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we analyzed the properties of a set of hypothetical hybrid pension plans 
by subsequently augmenting a defined contribution scheme by minimum and maximum lim-
its for pension benefits as a function of average and final salary, as well as minimum guaran-
tees and caps on the return of the members’ individual investment accounts. For the resulting 
plans, we focused in particular on the optimal investment strategies from the perspectives of 
both, plan sponsor and beneficiaries. 
The introduction of defined benefit elements increases the overall costs of running the 
pension plan substantially. These additional costs show a strong dependence on the chosen 
investment strategy.  
How the usual expected return/volatility trade-off of investment returns is translated 
into additional costs is determined by the specifics of the defined benefit elements. For ex-
ample in case of minimum pension benefits, the implied additional costs (expected and worst 
case values) are U-shaped as a function of expected investment returns. Therefore, assuming 
the objective to minimize the worst case value of additional costs, the sponsor will opt for 
asset allocations which deviate from the minimum risk allocation. Opposed to this, in case of 
minimum rate of return guarantees, additional costs increase monotonically as a function of 
higher expected asset return and volatility. However, the U-shape function is restored when 
minimum rate of return guarantees are combined with minimum or maximum pension bene-
fits or when a cap on the return of the members’ individual investment accounts is intro-
duced. In particular the latter element emerged in the simulation study as a powerful means to 
limit additional costs and hence allow the sponsor to choose asset allocations with a compa-
rable high share of equities. 
From the perspective of beneficiaries the paper first focused on the utility implications 
of alternative defined benefit elements and the sponsors’ asset allocation decisions. To this 
end security equivalents of pension benefits are calculated for a range of risk aversion pa-
rameters using the standard CRRA utility function. While generally higher additional costs 
imply higher expected pension benefits, the introduction of caps on credited asset returns al-  21
lows costs reduction at only slightly lower security equivalents. Secondly, the optimal in-
vestment choice from the beneficiaries’ perspective was analyzed. Almost independent of the 
respective degree of risk aversion, plan members chose the maximum return, maximum risk 
asset allocation in cases the plan guarantees minimum rate of return or minimum pension 
benefits. Only in case of minimum rate of return guarantees in combination with a cap on the 
maximum return credited to the individual accounts, medium and highly risk averse members 
opt for less risky asset allocations.  
The analysis presented in this study may also be useful to make observations about 
the design of hybrid pension plans. Some plan designs appear to be Pareto-inefficient (e.g. 
minimum and maximum pension benefits in combination with minimum rate of return guar-
antee) as they are dominated by others which imply lower additional costs and higher ex-
pected utility for plan members. Furthermore, in case plan sponsors and beneficiaries are 
jointly responsible for investment decision, caps on investment returns may reduce conflicts 
of interests as asset allocations respectively optimal for the parties, diverge to a lesser extent.   22
Appendix: Specification of Asset Dynamics, Interest, and Inflation Rates 
Table A1: Parameters of Asset Returns 
       Correlations 
  Mean  Volatility    Eurobonds  Global Equities  EM Equities 
Eurobonds 5.1  3.7    1     
Global Equities  7.6  17.9    0.21  1   
EM Equities  9.1  27.5    0.1  0.73  1 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Table A2: Parameters of Interest Rates and Inflation Dynamics 
          Correlations of Innovations 
  θ  κ  σ    3m Interest Rate  10y Interest Rate  Inflation Rate 
3m Interest Rate  0.043  0.114  0.012    1     
10y Interest Rate  0.05  0.075  0.01    0.8461  1   
Inflation Rate  0.02  0.286  0.011    0.7757  0.8103  1 
Eurobonds         0.0683  0.1396 0.0740 
Global Equities          -0.0100  0.0000  0.0100 
EM Equities          -0.0100  0.0000  0.0100 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The process is specified by  t t t dW dt X dX σ θ κ + − = ) (  , where Xt is the value of the Orn-
stein/Uhlenbeck process in t, kappa (κ) is the speed of mean-reversion, theta (θ) is the long-run mean, and 
sigma (σ) is the volatility of changes of the process. dWt is the increment of a standard Wiener process.   23
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Endnotes 
                                                      
1 The ECB operates a defined contribution pension scheme. The assets of the plan, which ex-
ist solely for the purpose of providing benefits for members of the plan and their dependants, 
are included in the other assets of the ECB. The benefits payable, resulting from the contribu-
tions of the ECB, have minimum guarantees underpinning the defined contribution benefits. 
2 Alternatively to above focus on absolute return, a minimum fixed rate of return guarantee 
may also be applied to a relative rate of return. For example Chile’s private pension funds are 
required to earn an annual real rate of return that is a function of the average annual real rate 
of return earned by all of Chile’s private pension funds (see Pennacchi 1999, p. 225). Fur-
thermore the guarantee may be applied to the account balance at the time of retirement, in-
stead of the assumed annual basis. 
3 As typical for public employees, the wage path until retirement is not-decreasing and, there-
fore, the guaranteed minimum pension benefits will always be lower than the maximum pen-
sion benefit limit. 
4 This link between assets and liabilities is in contrast to the analogy developed by Bodie and 
Davis (2000, p.6) comparing a pension plan to an equipment trust such as those set up by an 
airline to finance the purchase of airplanes. Here the equipment serves as specific collateral 
for the associated debt obligation. The borrowing firm’s liability is not affected by the value 
of the collateral. So, for instance, if the market value of the equipment were to double, this 
would greatly increase the security of the promised payments, but it would not increase their 
size. Opposed to this, in the scheme developed in this paper, the value of the assets may well 
affect the liabilities as a high return in a given year may increase the value of the liabilities as 
outlined above. 
5 A drawback of the Ornstein/Uhlenbeck process is the theoretically positive probability of 
negative nominal interest rates. This drawback is eliminated in the simulation procedure by 
cutting-off the negative nominal interest rates. 
6 The EIU forecasts are constructed with the aid of an econometric world model, maintained 










Optimal Investment Policies for Hybrid Pension




Learning and cooperation in network experiments
05-26 Zacharias Sautner
Martin Weber




Overconﬁdence of Professionals and Lay Men:
Individual Differences Within and Between Tasks?
05-24 Volker Stock´ e Determinanten und Konsequenzen von
Nonresponse in egozentrierten Netzwerkstudien
05-23 Lothar Essig Household Saving in Germany:
05-22 Lothar Essig Precautionary saving and old-age provisions: Do
subjective saving motives measures work?
05-21 Lothar Essig Imputing total expenditures from a non-exhaustive
05-20 Lothar Essig Measures for savings and saving rates in the
German SAVE data set
05-19 Axel B¨ orsch-Supan
Lothar Essig
Personal assets and pension reform: How well
prepared are the Germans?
05-18 Lothar Essig
Joachim Winter
Item nonresponse to ﬁnancial questions in
household surveys: An experimental study of
interviewer and mode effects
05-17 Lothar Essig Methodological aspects of the SAVE data set
05-16 Hartmut Esser Rationalit¨ at und Bindung. Das Modell der
Frame-Selektion und die Erkl¨ arung des normativen
HandelnsSONDERFORSCHUNGSBereich504 WORKING PAPER SERIES
Nr. Author Title
05-15 Hartmut Esser Affektuelles Handeln: Emotionen und das Modell
der Frame-Selektion
05-14 Gerald Seidel Endogenous Inﬂation - The Role of Expectations
and Strategic Interaction




05-12 Daniel Schunk Search behaviour with reference point preferences:
Theory and experimental evidence
05-11 Clemens Kroneberg Die Deﬁnition der Situation und die variable
Rationalit¨ at der Akteure. Ein allgemeines Modell




Diversiﬁkationseffekte durch Small und Mid Caps?
05-09 Gerald Seidel Fair Behavior and Inﬂation Persistence
05-08 Alexander Zimper Equivalence between best responses and
undominated strategies: a generalization from ﬁnite
to compact strategy sets.
05-07 Hendrik Hakenes
Isabel Schnabel
Bank Size and Risk-Taking under Basel II
05-06 Thomas Gschwend Ticket-Splitting and Strategic Voting




Classiﬁcation of Human Decision Behavior:
Finding
05-03 Thomas Gschwend Institutional Incentives for Strategic Voting:SONDERFORSCHUNGSBereich504 WORKING PAPER SERIES
Nr. Author Title
05-02 Siegfried K. Berninghaus
Karl-Martin Ehrhart
Marion Ott
A Network Experiment in Continuous Time:
05-01 Gesch¨ aftsstelle Jahresbericht 2004
04-70 Felix Freyland Household Composition and Savings: An Empirical
Analysis based on the German SOEP data
04-69 Felix Freyland Household Composition and Savings: An Overview




Chancen und Risiken der Riester-Rente
04-66 Alexander Ludwig
Alexander Zimper
Rational Expectations and Ambiguity: A Comment
on Abel (2002)
04-65 Axel B¨ orsch-Supan
Alexander Ludwig
Joachim Winter
Aging, Pension Reform, and Capital Flows:
04-64 Axel B¨ orsch-Supan From Traditional DB to Notional DC Systems:
Reframing PAYG contributions to ”notional
savings”




Pension Reform in Germany:
04-61 Axel B¨ orsch-Supan
Alexander Ludwig
Anette Reil-Held






Banning banking in EU emissions trading?